We give an entanglement assisted scheme for quantum key distribution. The scheme requires the maximally entangled 2-qubit state but does not require any quantum storage. Given the symmetric noisy channel, our scheme can tolerate the bit error rate up to 26% in the 4-state case and 30% in the 6-state respectively, respectively. These values are higher than those of all currently known two-level-state schemes without using a quantum storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) is different from classical cryptography in that an unknown quantum state is in principle not known unless it is disturbed, rather than the conjectured difficulty of computing certain functions.
The first published protocol, proposed in 1984 [1] , is called BB84 after its inventors (C.
H. Bennett and G. Brassard.) For a history of the subject, one may see e.g. [2] . In this protocol, the participants (Alice and Bob) wish to agree on a secret key about which no eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain significant information. Alice sends each bit of the secret key in one of a set of conjugate bases which Eve does not know, and this key is protected by the impossibility of measuring the state of a quantum system simultaneously in two conjugate bases. Since then, studies on QKD are extensive.
Most of the entanglement assisted QKD protocols such as the Lo-Chau protocol [3] are not so practical compared with the prepare and measure protocols such as BB84 [1] , 6-state protocol [4] , because normally the entanglement assisted protocols require a quantum storage which is generally believed to be technically difficult. However, producing the maximally entangled pairs is not a problem by our current technology. Maximally entangled pairs in polarization space can be robustly produced by the type two spontaneous parametric down conversion(SPDC) [5] . The proposed QKD protocol in this work does not require any quantum storage, though it uses the entanglement pairs, therefore it is practically implementable by the currently existing technology.
Normally, the channel for quantum bit transmission is noisy. The error to a qubit caused by the channel noise can be divided into σ The detected bit (or phase) flip error rate is the summation of σ x (or σ z ) error rate and σ y error rate. The most natural noisy channel is the symmetric channel, i.e., the σ x , σ z , σ y errors are equally distributed. One can take advantage of this type of symmetric channel in the QKD protocol [6] . To be sure that the channel noise is symmetric, one must use 6-state protocol. In the BB84 protocol, since the σ y error can never be detected or deduced, we have to assume the worst case of zero σ y error [6] . This is why the 4-state protocol can only tolerate a lower error rate than 6-state protocol. This is the reason that the largest tolerable bit flip error rate or phase flip error rate for BB84 protocol is 25%, lower than that of 6-state protocol, which is 33.3% [6] . However, in our entanglement assisted protocol, the channel flipping rate upper bound of 25% for the 4-state protocol is broken. The tolerable channel bit-flip and phase-flip rate is raised to 26% for the symmetric channel. This is not a strange result if we consider an entanglement purification protocol with bit flip error rejection and phase flip error rejection alternately: even though σ y error is never detected or deduced, the tolerable bit flip rate or phase flip rate can be as high as 33.3% for the entanglement distillation. In such a case one does not have to make sure of the σ y rate, he can check the bit flip rate and phase flip rate after the purification. If initially the error rate in indeed symmetrically distributed and the total flipping rate is less than 50%, he must be able to distill highly pure entangled state finally. In our entanglement assisted protocol, the tolerable bit flip rate or phase flip rate for the 6-state protocol is also raised to 30%.
Our entanglement assisted protocol can tolerate the highest error rate among all proven secure protocols raised in the world so far without using a quantum storage, for both 4-state protocol and 6-state protocol.
Practically speaking, a quantum channel is normally noisy therefore the raw key string with Bob and the string with Alice are normally not identical. Moreover, it is possible that, in the case Alice and Bob try to make the quantum key distribution, the channel noise could come from Eve. In such a case the raw key can be significantly correlated with Eve's quantum state. Even in the case that no bit flip or phase flip is detected on the subset of the check bits, the raw key is still not completely reliable or secure because there could be still a few bit flips or phase flips for the code bits which are unchecked. To obtain the highly reliable and secure key, one has to take the error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) to the raw key and then use the final key. Although the classical EC can be used to remove all bit-value errors (with a high probability) therefore to help Alice and Bob obtain a reliable key, it's not transparent that whether the classical PA can really work here:
Eve may first store her qubits which are correlated with the raw key. After Alice and Bob complete the EC and PA, she then takes an optimized measurement to her qubits directly attacking the final key. A strict mathematical proof for the unconditional security is nontrivial [7] [8] [9] . The security proof of QKD is greatly simplified if one connects this with the quantum entanglement purification protocol (EPP) [10] [11] [12] . The main idea is conceptually simple and clear: Alice and Bob first share a number of raw entanglement pairs and then purify them to almost maximally entangled pairs and measure each of them to obtain the final key [12] . The strict mathematical security proof with EPP was given by Lo and Chau [3] . Interestingly, it was then shown by Shor and Preskill [13] that Lo-Chau entanglement purification based protocol can be reduced to the quantum error correction (QEC) protocol with one-way communication and the QEC protocol is equivalent to BB84 protocol followed by the classical EC and PA done by decoding a classical CSS code. Shor-Preskill protocol [13] works as long as the measured bit flip error and phase flip error rates are less than 11%, the point at which the Shannon rate hits 0. Note that this threshold is lower than that of certain EPP protocols with two-way communications (2-EPP): the 2-EPP with error rejection works as long as the summation of measured bit error and flip error rates are less than a 50%. In such a case, Alice and Bob randomly choose two pairs and measure the parity of 2 qubits in each side and discard both pairs if the parities disagree and keep one pair and discard the other pair if the parities agree with each other. In such a way, the bit flip error is reduced if they measure the parity in Z basis; the phase flip error is reduced if they measure the parity in X basis. X, Y and Z represents the basis in the eigenstates of operator σ x , σ y and σ z respectively. The vector representation for the two level state is
As we shall remark latter, this type 2-EPP with error rejection done in both Z basis and X basis cannot be reduced to a classical protocol. In a classical protocol, Alice just sends Bob the qubits prepared in X or Z (or Y) basis randomly and then they carry out EPP task as if they were sharing a number of raw entangled pairs. Or equivalently, in a classicalized protocol, Alice had measured her halves of the entangled pairs before the protocol was started. They can still do the parity comparison on Z basis, but they will not be able to do so in X basis: they are never able to know what the parity values should be if they had really used entangled pairs here therefore they don't know whether they should discard both bits or keep one bit. Very recently, motivated for higher bit error rate tolerance and higher efficiency, Gottesman and Lo [6] studied the classicalization of 2-EPP. It has been shown there that a 2-EPP can be classicalized iff the their operation after the phase parity comparison is deterministic. In such a case they can carry out the task as if they were doing the 2-EPP on entangled pairs. Based on this observation, a new QKD protocol was given there [6] with partially two way communications: in removing the bit flip errors, the error-rejection method is used with two way communication; in removing the phase flip error, the error correction method is used with one way communication, i.e., Alice asked Bob to measure the syndrome of certain randomly chosen 3 qubits and Bob will use the majority rule to decide whether to take a phase flip operation to one of the 3 qubits. This method has increased the tolerable bit error rate of noisy channel to 18.9% and 26.4% for 4-state QKD and 6-state QKD, respectively. Very recently, these values have been upgraded to 20% and 27.4% by Chau [16] .
In this paper, we propose a revised scheme to further increase these thresholds on bit error rates. We propose to let Alice send Bob the quantum states randomly chosen from
(|00 −|11 ), |00 , |11 }. As we shall see, these states are just the quantum phase-flip error-rejection (QPFER) code for the BB84 state {|0 , |1 ,
When Bob receives them, he first decodes each two-qubit code to the one-qubit state (a BB84 state) and then carry out the rest tasks of EC and PA. In decoding, Bob discards those codes which contains one bit-flip error therefore after decoding the phase-flip error for the accepted bits are greatly decreased. As we are going to show, we may take this advantage to increase the threshold of the tolerable bit error rate caused by the noisy channel.
II. GOTTESMAN-LO PROTOCOL: ERROR-REJECTION AND ERROR-CORRECTION
There are many ways to do entanglement purification. However, not all of them can be used for the security proof of a QKD protocol without using quantum storage. To carry out such a task one must first study an entanglement purification based QKD protocol and then
show that the protocol is classicalizable, i.e., to show that it is equivalent to the case where Alice measures all her halves of entangled pairs initially and continue with all other steps in the protocol. Different types of EPP may tolerate different flipping rates of the channel.
We now first analyse the reason why the currently existing protocols [6, 16] does not reach the theoretically allowed threshold of the channel flipping rate. To prove a secure QKD protocol, one may first consider an entanglement purification protocol and then find out the corresponding QKD protocol based on that. In general, one has two simple ways to purify entangled pairs shared by spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob. One method is the error-rejection [10] : The raw pairs are randomly divided into many 2-pair groups. To each group, Alice and Bob measure the parity on each side. If they obtain the same parity value, they discard the target pair and keep the control pair (see Fig. 1 ). If the parity values are different, they discard both pairs. In doing the parity check, they can choose the measurement basis of Z 1 Z 2 to reduce the bit flip errors or the basis of X 1 X 2 to reduce the phase flip errors. Suppose the initially shared raw pairs between Alice and Bob bear the σ x , σ y , σ z errors are p x , p y , p z , respectively. Let
of bit-flip error-rejection, the error rate for the survived pairs is changing by the following iteration formula as given by Chau [16] :
(1)
Exchange p x and p z above we can obtain the iteration formula by phase error-rejection operation. By taking the error-rejection operation alternately in Z basis and X basis for many rounds, one can always distill out maximally entangled pairs asymptotically from the
. This is to say, with the error-rejection method, the theoretical upper bound of tolerable channel flipping rate for QKD distribution can be reached. For the symmetric channel, the bit-flip rate or the phase-flip rate can be as high as 33.3% no matter whether we use the 4-state protocol or 6-state protocol. However, the error-rejection method above cannot be clasicalized to the prepareand-measure QKD protocol since if Alice had measured her halves in Z basis initially, Alice and Bob would have no way to take phase-flip error-rejection. Note that the error-rejection method means they have to decide whether they should keep one bit or discard both bits according to the measurement result.
To overcome this barrier, Gottesman and Lo proposed to use the error-correction method to reduce the phase-flip error: they correct a possible error by [3, 1, 3] 2 code instead of discarding the the corrupted pairs, once a possible error is detected. To do so, Alice and Bob randomly choose 3 pairs in one group. They each measure the parity of qubits 2,3 and qubit 1,2 and compare both values ( Fig. 2) . After the comparison, they decide whether to take a flip operation to pair 1. They keep pair 1 and discard pair 2 and pair 3. With a high probability that pair one is now free of phase flip error if the parity checks are done in X basis. However the tolerable initial error rate is decreased with this method towards the distillation of maximally entangled pairs. This implies that the error-rejection can be more effective than error-correction in the entanglement distillation.
In Gottesman-Lo QKD protocol, Alice and Bob distill the classical bits as if they were distilling the entangled pairs: no one knows whether Alice had measured her halves of the entangled pairs initially. Therefore the security of the protocol is equivalent to that in a real entanglement distillation protocol, which has been proved to be unconditionally secure [3] .
Gottesman-Lo protocol reduces the bit flip error by error-rejection and reduces the phase flip error by error-correction. Although in the case of real entanglement distillation, Alice may often need to phase flip certain qubit according to the parity comparison result for phase-flip error-correction in the entanglement purification protocol. However, if the final purpose is to set up the faithful and secure key only, Alice need not really take any phase flip. Instead, she may simply use the parity of randomly chosen 3 bits as the new bit value after "error-correction" (see Fig.2 ).
The phase flip does not affect the final bit result therefore omitting the phase flip will not affect the reliability of the final key. That is, the final key is as faithful as that in the case Alice takes phase flip to her qubits as required by the standard entanglement purification. Moreover, one can also find that omitting the phase flip operation does not affect the security either. Consider the case that Alice never takes phase flip to her qubit but she keeps the information in the mind that which qubit should be phase flipped and then continue the distillation, they will finally obtain |χ 1 ⊗ |χ 2 · · · |χ n . Each |χ i is either
(|00 − |11 ) and Alice explicitly knows the state of each pair (with a probability exponentially close to 1). That is to say, if Alice never takes any phase flip, Alice and Bob will share a product of different maximally entangled state. Note that the shared pairs are in a pure state. Therefore those shared pairs, with a probability exponentially close to 1, are unentangled with any third party. The security in such a case is totally equivalent to the case where all shared pairs are in state |Φ + . Further, even Alice never keeps any information in her mind on which qubit should be phase flipped, the security is unchanged.
Because even in such a case, the finally distilled pairs are also unentangled with any third party. The only thing that is important here is that Alice would be able to know the state of finally distilled pairs if she had remembered the information on which qubit should be phase flipped.
One may further reduce the above protocol. Taking the fact that the phase flip operation can actually be ignored, Alice can then choose to measure each of her halves of EPR pair in Z basis initially and send the other halves to Bob and then carry out the same entanglement purification scheme as if they were sharing the entangled pairs. This reduction should not affect the reliability of Bob's final key because it does not affect any bit value in Z basis. Note that the operation commutes with all operations taken by Alice latter on. This reduction should be as secure as before because Eve will never know whether Alice had measured her halves of EPR pairs in the beginning, even with the full collaboration with Bob. Suppose the reduction at this step is insecure. We have already known that the final key is secure if Alice had not measured her halves of pairs . Then we shall get the confliction that Eve.
and Bob will be able to know whether Alice had measured her qubits in the beginning by checking whether Bob's final key is significantly correlated with Eve's assumed key.
From the above analysis we spot one important fact in Gottesman-Lo protocol [6] and its modified version [16] : Alice and Bob are only allowed to take error-correction but not allowed to take error-rejection operation to treat the phase flip error, otherwise it cannot be classicalized. But error-rejection operation can be more effective in removing errors. This is the reason why the error rate threshold cannot reach the theoretically allowed value, i.e., the threshold for the real entanglement distillation with all error-rejection method.
III. PHASE-FLIP ERROR REJECTION WITH 2-QUBIT ERROR REJECTION
CODE.
To improve the tolerable channel error rate threshold in quantum key distribution, one may naturally consider the possibility of using error-rejection method to reduce the phase error also. Naively, one may consider the real 2-EPP. But that requires the quantum storage which is obviously impractical with our current technology. However, with the quantum error-rejection code as we are going into, one can take the error-rejection quantumly therefore any quantum storage is unnecessary. However, if we want to use quantum phase error-rejection code to remove the phase flip error in all rounds, we must then use a large concatenated quantum code which is also impractical. Keeping this point in mind, we choose to use quantum error-rejection only at the first round therefore we only need a 2-bit quantum code to encode each initial qubits with Alice:
Here the second |0 state qubit in the left hand side of the arrow is the ancilla for the encoding. Therefore the initial perfect EPR pair |Φ + with Alice is encoded by the following formula before sending half of it Bob over noisy channel:
Alice then sends qubits B1 and B2 to Bob. In receiving them, Bob first takes a parity check,
i.e. measures Z 1 Z 2 . Note that this measurement does not destroy the code state itself.
Moreover, any linear superposition of |00 and |11 is an eigenstate of Z the survived raw pairs will be decreased. Suppose the channel error rates of σ x , σ y , σ z types are p x0 , p y0 , p z0 , respectively. Let
. With a probability of p 2 I0 there is no error to both qubit B1 and B2. In such a case, the state after decoding is exactly |Φ + .
Explicitly, with no flip happens the total state for A, B1 and B2 before decoding is
Note that the total state is symmetric to qubit B1 and B2. Suppose Bob takes measurement in X basis to qubit B1 for the decoding. From the formula above we can see that the state for qubits A and B2 will be collapsed to |0 |+ + |1 |− if he obtains |+ for qubit B1, after a Hadamard transformation, the shared pair is changed to |Φ + for sure. Qubits A and B2
will be collapsed to |0 |+ − |1 |+ if he obtains |− for qubit B1. In such a case, he will first take a Hadamard transformation to B2 and then flip it in Z basis. After these operations, the shared pair is also changed back to state |Φ + for sure. If one of the transmitted qubit bears a bit flip error (including both σ x and σ y error) while the other transmitted qubit does not bear the bit flip error (e.g., it can be of no error or of σ z error), the code will be discarded for sure after the parity check. The probability for this type of event is 2(p x0 +p y0 )(p I0 +p z0 ).
If both transmitted qubits bear bit flip errors with arbitrary phase flip errors, or none of them suffer a bit flip error with arbitrary phase flips, the 2-qubit code will pass the parity check and be accepted. In such a case Alice and Bob will share a wrong state after decoding.
However, the probability for such cases are small. We list the probability distribution for all possible states after decoding in the following table: joint channel error probability state after decoding raw pair error
We use {α ⊗ β} to denote both α ⊗ β and β ⊗ α in the most left column above. There are other types of joint errors to the two transmitted qubits besides those listed in the above table. However, all codes with those types of unlisted joint channel errors will be discarded after Bob's parity check operation. After renormalize the probability distribution for each term in the above table we can obtain the error rate distribution for the survived raw pairs shared by Alice and Bob.
With this formula, the phase flip error to the shared raw pairs is obviously reduced. The formula is similar to the error-rejection formula by directly measuring the parity of two pairs on each side. Therefore such a code can be more effective than [3, 1, 3] 2 error correction code in reducing phase-flip errors and can cause advantages to the QKD protocols. Note that it is a bit subtle that the phase error to the decoded state is caused by bit-flip channel errors.
IV. ENTANGLEMENT ASSISTED PROTOCOL.
We first consider the following entanglement purification based protocol with quantum storages:
1 Alice prepare N copies of EPR state |Φ
She also prepares N ancilla qubits which are all in state |0 . We shall use the subscript B2 for each of theses N ancilla qubits. To each pair, she will keep qubit A with herself.
2 Alice takes unitary transformation given in Eq. (2) to qubits B1 and B2. B1 and B2
are now the phase-flip quantum error-rejection code for the original state of qubit B1.
Now the total state of qubit A, B1, B2 is in the form of eq.(3).
3 Alice sends each 2-qubit code (B1,B2) to Bob and keeps qubits A. 7 Alice and Bob then take the bit-flip error-rejection [6] : they divide the rest of the survived raw pairs into many 2-pair groups. The two pairs for each individual groups are randomly chosen. They measure the parity of each group in Z basis at each side and compare the results. They discard those groups whose parities on two sides disagree; they discard the target pair and keep the control pair (see Fig.1 )if the results at two sides agree with each other. They can repeatedly take this bit-flip error correction for g round.
8 They can then take the [r, 1, r] 2 phase-flip error-correction code as proposed in [16] to reduce the phase-flip error. They should choose the appropriate g and r value so that both bit-flip error and phase-flip error are small enough therefore the shared pairs can be distilled to maximally entangled by a certain classicalizable distillation method in the next step.
9 They further purify the survived pairs by a classicalizable distillation method so that the error rate of their shared pairs are exponentially small. The classicalizable distillation method means the method which can be reduced to an equivalent prepare-and measure scheme [6] where no quantum storage is required.
Note that this scheme requires the quantum storage. We shall classicalize it to an equivalent form latter therefore a quantum storage is unnecessary. For the moment we first calculate the largest tolerable channel error rate of the protocol.
The two-qubit error-rejection code decreases the phase flip error and increases the bit flip error of the shared raw pairs. After the quantum decoding Alice and Bob will reduce the bit flip error rate by bit flip error-rejection. The error rate for the survived pairs after one round bit flip error-rejection is given by Eq.(1). This is the formula which is used iteratively in the multi-rounds bit-flip error-rejection. In doing the error rejection for bit-flip error, the phase flip rate and also perhaps the total error rate is increased. After some rounds of bit flip error rejection, one must then reduce to the phase flip error rate by the scheme of phase flip error-correction. In the original Gottesman-Lo protocol, [3, 1, 3] 2 code is used. Actually, any
[r, 1, r] 2 error correction code can be used for that task and any [r, 1, r] 2 can be classicalized [16] . In our protocol, we have followed Chau's protocol: carry out the bit flip error-rejection repeatedly and use an appropriate [r, 1, r] 2 code to reduce the phase error. After the phase error correction, the new error rates satisfy the following inequalities provided that p I > 1/2.
This shows that, given p x0 , p y0 , p z0 , if there exits a finite number k, after k rounds of bit-flip error-rejection, we can find a r which satisfy
One can then obtain the unconditional secure and faithful final key with a further purification through any classicalizable methods.
To the above 4-state protocol, although the p y0 value is not detected, we don't have to assume p y0 = 0. We actually need not to know it. What we need to know is each types of error rates to the raw pairs, i.e. p x , p y , p z . Based on the information of p x , p y , p z we then decide whether the shared raw pairs are distillable by the remained steps in the scheme. In other words, this is equivalent to the case where Alice directly sends the EPR halves to Bob through an un-symmetric noisy channel with flip rates of p x , p y , p z instead of p x0 , p y0 , p z0 .
That is to say, the role of the quantum phase flip error-rejection code is to replace the natural channel error rate p x0 , p y0 , p z0 by the effective channel error rate of p x , p y , p z which are linked by eq.(5). Note that a quantum bit-flip error-rejection code will not help to improve the tolerable error rate of Gottesman-Lo protocol [6] because the effect of that is equivalent to that of the classical bit-flip error-rejection as used there. In the 4-state protocol, we don't detect the σ y error therefore we have to assume p y = 0 after the quantum parity check and decoding. This shows that, if the channel noise is symmetric, after the quantum decoding, both σ z error and σ y error are reduced, i.e., the detectable phase error rate( including both σ z and σ y error rate) has been reduced in a rate as it should be in the case of symmetric noisy channel. We then start from the un-symmetric error rate with assumption p y = 0 and p x , p z being the detected bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate, respectively. After the calculation, we find that the tolerable error rate of bit flip or phase flip is 26% for the 4-state protocol.
Moreover, in the case that the channel error itself is un-symmetric, e.g., p y0 = 0; p x0 = p z0 , the tolerable channel error rate for our protocol is p x0 = p z0 ≤ 21.7%.
V. THE PROTOCOL WITHOUT QUANTUM STORAGE
The above QKD scheme requires a quantum storage for both Alice and Bob. This is impractical by our current technology. However, the scheme can be reduced to an equivalent scheme which does not require a quantum storage. We now show it in details.
In the protocol above, the phase-flip quantum error-correction code of [r, 1, r] is used [16] . This is equivalent to the classical method of replacing the r bits by one new bit whose value is just the parity of those r bits [16] . For example, one may consider the case of r = 3. As it was shown in Ref. [6] , the parity measurement in X basis can be replaced by the equivalent one in Z basis, see Fig.2 . The actual operation is just to replace the bit value of qubit 1 by the parity of 3 qubits. More generally, the [3, 1, 3] 2 error correction code can be replaced by [r, 1, r] 2 code with the majority rule, i.e., replacing the original one bit value by the parity of r bits [16] . The initial EPR pairs prepared by Alice will be treated in three different ways:
some of them will be used as the check pairs; some of them will be discarded after the parity check before decoding; some of them will be used for the entanglement distillation. To those check pairs, Alice's only operation to qubit A is just a measurement in either Z basis or X basis, there is no other operation therefore Alice can choose to measure qubit A before encoding qubit B1. After Bob's parity check before decoding, some quantum codes will be discarded. The discarded codes do not affect any results of final key, therefore Alice may choose to measure qubit A initially in any basis to each of those qubits. To those qubits which will be used for the distillation, Alice's all operations are done in Z basis, therefore
Alice can choose to measure all those qubits A in Z basis before encoding B1. Moreover, instead of preparing each single qubits and then encoding them with ancilla by Hadamard transformation and C-NOT gate, Alice may directly prepare the error rejection code and put down the bit value corresponding to the code. That is, code |00 , |11 ,
(|00 − |11 ) correspond to single qubit state |+ , |− , |0 , |1 respectively.
With the above arguments, the protocol can be revised to the following protocol without a quantum storage:
1 Alice prepares N 2-qubit quantum codes with each of them randomly chosen from the set {|00 , |11 ,
(|00 ± |11 )}. Among all of them, N/4 of them are prepared in |00
or |11 with equal probability and 3N/4 of them are prepared in
(|00 ± |11 ) with equal probability. She records the the "preparation basis" as X basis for code |00 or |11 ; and as Z basis for code
(|00 ± |11 ) [18] . And she records the bit value of 0 for the code |00 or
(|00 + |11 ); bit value 1 for the code |11 or
She sends each randomly chosen 2-qubit codes to Bob. 4 They reduce the bit flip rate by the following way: they randomly group all their unchecked bits with each group containing 2 bits. They compare the parity of each group. If the results are different, they discard both bits. If the results are same, they discard one bit and keep the other. They repeatedly do so for a number of rounds until they believe that both bit flip rate and phase flip rate will be reduced to less than 5%
with the next step being taken.
5 They then randomly group the remained bits with each group containing r bits. They use the parity of each group as the new bits.
6 They use any other proven secure classical methods to further reduce the error rate until both bit flip rate and phase flip rate are negligible, e.g. less than 2 −50 . Here "other classical methods" includes the Gottesman-Lo method [6] , the classical CSS code [13] , the concatenated 7-bit code [16] and so on.
The above classicalized protocol is totally equivalent to the one based on entanglement purification in the previous section, therefore it tolerates the same channel error rate as that that of the entanglement purification based protocol. That is to say, this classicalized 4-state protocol can tolerate a channel flipping rate of 26%. Although the quantum storage is removed now, it still requires the parity check and decoding operation for Bob. We now show how to make it with ordinary linear optics devices.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION.
The 2-qubit codes in our protocol above can be robustly produced form SPDC process [5] . In such a polarization space, |0 , |1 are represented by the horizontal polarization state and vertical polarization state. In the "classicalized" protocol above, Bob need to take the operation of quantum parity check and quantum decoding to the codes received from Alice.
In practice, Bob can take the two operation together with a polarizing beam splitter and obtain the result by post-selection. Bob's operation to the incoming 2-qubit code is shown in Fig.(3) . If he obtains nothing in either D1 or D2 measurement, he aborts the code; if there is one photon on each side of the PBS, he records the bit value and "measurement basis"
according to the correspondence rule in step 2 in the protocol. Note that a PBS transmits the horizontal qubits and reflects the vertical qubits. In Alice's initial preparation of the quantum code, the two qubits have the same polarization. If one of them is flipped in Z basis by the channel, the code will contain two different polarizations and both photons will be on the same side of the PBS, i.e., either D1 or D2 will be vacuum, therefore the code will be discarded. To verify the fact of one photon on each side of the PBS, Bob only needs to see that both photon detectors on each side of the PBS click. Note that we only need yes-no photon detectors here. The low efficiency of the detectors does not affect the security of the protocol.
VII. 6-STATE PROTOCOL
Our protocol can obviously be extended to the 6-state protocol. In doing so, Alice just change the initially random codes by adding N/4 codes from { 1 2
This is equivalent to
({|00 ∓i|11 )}. She regards all this type codes as Y bits. In decoding the codes, Bob's "measurement basis" is randomly chosen from 3 basis, with the basis of
(|0 ± i|1 ) being added. All decoded X bits, Y bits and the same number of decoded Z bits which are randomly chosen will be used as the check bits. Since the Hadamard transformation will switch the two eigenstates of σ y , therefore in classicalized protocol, after the decoding if Bob choose to take the measurement to B2 qubit in Y basis, he shall records his "measurement basis" as Y but the "measurement outcome" should be flipped in the Y basis so that to obtain everything the same as that in the 2-EPP with quantum storages.
In such a way, if the channel is symmetric, Bob will find p y = 0. And he will know p x , p y , p z exactly instead of assuming p y = 0. This will increase the tolerable error rate accordingly.
We find that the tolerable bit flip rate and phase flip rate are 30% in such a case, i.e., our 6-state protocol can tolerate a total flip rate of 45% with the symmetric noisy channel.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARK.
We have proposed an entanglement assisted protocol for quantum key distribution. In 4-state case, the tolerable bit flip or phase flip rate is 26%; in the 6 state case, the values are increased to 30%, given symmetric noisy channel. The initial 2-qubit entangled state can be produced through SPDC process [5] . Bob's quantum parity check and decoding can be done with a polarizing beam splitter. Obviously, all devices appeared in our proposed scheme are just ordinary devices in linear optics.
There are also some loosen ends for our protocol in practical realization. In the SPDC process, there are also some multi-pair emission with small probability. This type of emission will affect the security that should be taken into consideration for the security proof for a practical entanglement assisted QKD protocol with SPDC process. We believe this can be solved in the similar idea for the case of imperfection of the single photon source for the BB84 scheme. We have neither considered the devices imperfections, e.g., the dark counting of the photon detectors. Similar to other QKD proposals [6, 16] , here the tolerable upper bound for channel error rate is calculated asymptotically. In practice, the number of qubits sent to Bob is always finite. With the statistical fluctuation being taken into consideration, the tolerable flip rate of the channel is decreased in practice with a finite number of initial qubits. 
